WOLNOŚĆ SŁOWA W ORZECZNICTWIE EUROPEJSKIEGO TRYBUNAŁU PRAW CZŁOWIEKA

Abstract

Having recourse to concrete examples of cases in course before the Tribunal - the Author discusses evolution, nature and conception of human rights, human rights in the light of the principle of substitution and the system of protection of human rights in Europe. He is next analyzing the issue of freedom of expression in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and respective regulations comprised in the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as conceptual foundation o f limitations put on human rights in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. The Author notes that decisions of the European Tribunal of Human Rights do distinguish between honesty and reliability as far as an evaluation of the results of the doings of journalists is concerned. The notion of conjunction between the ranges of significance of the honesty of journalists on one hand and of the reliability of information transmitted on the other - would inevitably lead to an absolutization of the truth and, moreover, would situate the responsibility o f a journalist for true informing - on a level higher than in scientific cognition. Or, even in scientific cognition the postulate of honesty is being absorbed by the postulate of scientific uprightness. The postulate of honesty is in relation with the postulate of clear formulation of statements. Just in this light must be evaluated all the duties and responsibility o f the mass media for press publications. Chief editors or publishers should honestly collect and then evaluate the sources of information and confront them with other means of establishing factual state of a matter. If we admit in practice of the mass media the existence of responsibility for establishing the truth in conformity with an obligation ensuing from the results - the right for free exchange o f opinions including the right to receive and transmit information would become only a formal ornament on the scene of autocratic regime.